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On the Politics of Societal Constitutionalism
EMILIOS CHRISTODOULIDIS*
ABSTRACT
This paper is an internal critique of the theory of societal
constitutionalism as developed by Gunther Teubner, with a specific
emphasis on the constitutional and the political dimensions of the theory.
As critique it focuses on the arguably unacknowledged dangers of
co-option: the danger that constitutionalization, as an ongoing process,
undercuts what we typically associate with the constitutional, which is
its framing function; that this problem is accentuated when it comes to
the transnational; and that its reflexivity runs the danger of market
capture, in which case it remains only nominally political. The danger of
market capture for societal constitutionalism is that the market becomes
the means of calling forth the "societal" by submitting it to functional
imperatives and, in the final instance, harnessing it to market
allocations. This paper is, however, also an internal critique, because it,
too, relies on the key concept of reflexive self-definition, aspiring to think
it on an uncompromisingly political register.
INTRODUCTION
Older constitutional probl6matiques of a more romantic radical bent
typically returned to the promise of constituent power to address the
following question: If a political society or collective is that which acts
through rules of ascription, to what extent can that ascription remain
reconfigurable, reflexive, alive to redefinition, and open both to
operationalization and transcendence by the collective that it names?
This is of course also the probldmatique of Marxism, of a certain
Marxism, that self-consciously places the subject of emancipation in
media res, both bound to the modalities of an ascription that cannot be
stepped behind while at the same time holding on to the promise of an
overcoming and genuine reflexive process of self-definition. If
self-definition appears a million miles away from our current stunned
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impotence before the financial meltdown, the theory of societal
constitutionalism promises to carve out some space for reflexivity
amidst the debris. It promises this by severing off the constitutional
from the state and returning it in capillary form as appropriate to the
logic of social fields. With an eye both to the constitutive and the
limitative dimensions of constitutionalism, Gunther Teubner asks for a
reorientation of constitutional language away from the state and toward
the self-organization of functional spheres.' It is only through such
reorientation that the "growth compulsions" and expansionist
tendencies of systems, crucially that of the economic system that has
ravaged society, may be reined in. Since "every function system defines
its own identity for itself . . . through an elaborated semantics of
self-ascription of meaning, of reflection, of autonomy," 2 Teubner says,
quoting Niklas Luhmann, the question for societal constitutionalism
becomes this: Can external pressure be exerted on the subsystems of
such force that the self-limitations of their options for action will take
effect in their internal processes?
Such autolimitative, "system-internal" reflection-conceptualized as
constitutionalization-can be initiated and mandated
externally-politically and legally-but cannot be substituted for. That
is why an external political determination of transnational social
subconstitutions is not feasible. Only constitutional irritants, i.e.
political impulses to constitutionalize, are possible. "The fundamental
problem" to which societal constitutionalism is the answer is the
following, according to Teubner: "How is it possible to increase external
pressure in order to stem the negative externalities of autonomous
subsystems by means of their internal self-limitation?" His answer, as
will be explained in more detail below, is that the "subsystems' own self-
limitation" involves tapping resources of reflexivity and instigating
internal processes of selection, whose impetus is sustained externally
but processed internally in the form of an "internal politicization," as
constitutively directed to the question of the public interest.
"This is the message of societal constitutionalism. Any global
constitutional order is faced with the task: how can a sufficiently large
degree of external pressure be generated on the subsystems to push
them into self-limitations of their options?"4 With an eye both to the
1. GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND GLOBALIZATION (2012).
2. Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of 'Hitting the Bottom, in
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL
DIFFERENTIATION 3, 14 (Poul Kjaer, Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 2011).
3. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 41.
4. Id. at 84.
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constitutive and the limitative, Teubner asks both questions in tandem:
Not only what are the institutional preconditions of the autonomy of
functional subsystems, but also where are the limits of their expansion?
One has to begin from the "constitutive" dimension of the
self-foundation of systems in order to understand the options available
to rein them in. For Teubner, the constitution of the economy, science,
the media, etc.,
perform the same constitutive function by securing for
each sphere the autonomy of their specific medium,
today on a global scale. Each partial constitution makes
use of "constitutive rules" to regulate the abstraction of a
homogenous communicative medium-power, money,
law, knowledge-as an autonomous social construct
within a globally-constituted function system. At the
same time the constitutions make sure that the
society-wide impact of their communicative media is
guaranteed under different historical conditions. They
develop organizational rules, procedures, competences,
and subjective rights for both these orientations,
codifying the separation between the social spheres and,
in this way, shore up the functional differentiation of
society.5
While "high cognitive demands" will be made of "national and
international interventions by the world of states," especially in a
situation of economic crisis, the temptation must be resisted to
substitute their-the states'-reason for that of the focal system, here
the economy.6 Instead, their intervention should consist of the selective
generation of "constitutional irritants" that will translate into
self-steering and that will liberate systems from pathologies in the form
of "self-blockades," but not superimpose state rationality.7 State-run
command economies, is the (not so) implicit message, failed for
attempting such a substitution, and buttressed the failure with state
terror-hence Teubner's warning that "following the experiences of
political totalitarianism in the last century, a permanent subordination
of the subsystems to the state is no longer a valid option."8 Hence there
is "no alternative but to experiment with constitutionalisation," in the
hope that, "with a bit of luck," "the external and internal programmes"
5. Id. at 75-76.
6. Teubner, supra note 2, at 14
7. Id. at 14-15.
8. Id. at 13
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of irritating and irritated systems" will "play out together along the
desired course."9
This paper raises the reflexive question of what is societal about
societal constitutionalism. And it raises it against what we might
describe as the danger of double slippage. The first dimension of
slippage concerns the constitutional: the conscious and incessant
distancing of societal constitutionalism from any debt to-or leverage
from-the political or state systems threatens to undercut its
constitutional grounding and send it into free fall. If, as we will see, the
constitutional reflexivity of social spheres depends on a (metalevel)
coupling with law, the question for the constitutional is what work the
law can do to sustain the reflexivity of the system with which it is
coupled. The second dimension, more insidiously, involves the danger of
market capture, whereby the market calls forth the societal by
submitting it to functional imperatives, and, in the final instance
harnessing it to market allocations. I want to insist on the formulation
"final instance" here, for there is no direct link between functional
imperative and market allocation. But I will argue that functional
equivalence, at some level, involves a comparability that it secures
through the market, no longer as arbiter of economic value, but of value
simpliciter. In the face of the double slippage, any envisaged response to
the crisis runs the risk of remaining either muted or co-opted,
respectively.
The paper positions itself as an internal critique of the theory of
societal constitutionalism as developed by Teubner. It is critical because
I focus on what I will argue are, often unacknowledged, dangers of
co-option: the danger that constitutionalization, as an ongoing process,
undercuts what we typically associate with the constitutional, which is
its framing function (Part III); the danger that this problem is
accentuated when it comes to the transnational (Part II); and the
danger that its reflexivity submits to market capture, in which case it
remains only nominally political (Part IV). If the paper is, however, an
internal critique, it is because it too borrows the key concept of reflexive
self-definition, aspiring to situate it on an uncompromisingly political
register (Part V). First, however, a few caveats will be presented (Part
I).
Before that, let me preempt an objection, even if at this stage I can
do no more than flag it. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of my
argument about societal constitutionalism is the normative prescription
of insisting on the necessity of an irreducible political dimension. There
are two key terms here, "irreducible" and "political." By "irreducible" I
9. Id. at 15.
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mean not convertible into the coding of the receiving system. My worry
about societal constitutionalism, and my fundamental difference with
Teubner, is that any assumed dialectic between external and internal
politicization collapses too quickly into the latter pole, if the premise of
functional differentiation, as guarantor of nothing short of the
autonomy of spheres of action and thus freedom, is treated in all cases
as non-negotiable. Under conditions of complete functional autonomy,
what is political about internal "politicization" is a question for the
social subsystem, and only for the social subsystem, to answer. My
suggestion is that such enfolding be "ruptured" in the only way it can
be, which is externally, i.e. politically. In what sense to understand
"politically?" With this question, we turn to the second of the key terms.
There is a temptation, one that Luhmann himself would rarely resist, to
recall the state alongside any reference to the political. But systems,
according to Luhmann and Teubner, are first and foremost systems of
meaning, phenomenological reductions that allow for the emergence of
communicative fields. In this reduction and this emergence, the
semantics of the state have been significant for the consolidation of the
political system, orienting and organizing meaningful communication
around those semantics. Democracy too, in the process, has been
thematized in terms of the difference between government and
opposition, a super-coding that for Luhmann gradually displaces
alternative "distinctions directrices." But it would be wrong to treat all
this as anything but a historical, contingent development, especially
under conditions of globalization where the state is called on to play an
increasingly selective role in its relation to capital in the consolidation of
the global system. The locus of the political has always also been in the
contestation of such renderings of public space and such
conceptualizations of power distributions, and this reflexivity is
constitutive of the meaning of the political.
Let us not lose sight throughout this of the critique of "the
self-ascription of meaning," and a critique of that critique. It is in the
context of the promise of a special kind of reflexivity that systems
theory can be understood as critical theory. We therefore must relate it,
as an internal critique, to the double danger that we saw confronting
societal constitutionalism: on the one hand, a "constitutionalism" so
under-determined as "constitutionalization" that it fails to perform any
"gathering" work at all; and on the other, a concept of the "societal" that
surrenders constitutionalism, constitutively, to the logic of price.
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I. THREE CAVEATS
A. Crisis as Opportunity
Explicit in Hitting the Bottom,10 and implicit in Constitutional
Fragments, is the spectre of crisis. How is systems theory poised at this
historical conjuncture, before the dynamics of societal subsystems
spinning out of control? Teubner's insistence on the limitative has an
important role to play when "tipping points" are reached, in which case
a reaction cannot help but be generated. In the face of impending
catastrophe, the constitutive dynamics of systemic augmentation will be
reined in, and subrationalities-systemic, partial-will yield to the
requirements of an overall limit. Constitutionalising
Polycontexturality,11 for example, culminates in an argument and a
warning about preventing "catastrophe." Teubner's concern is that
"freed up energies" may "spin out of control," to have corrupting or even
destructive social effects, when a "tipping point" may be reached, at
which we may even have a "collision" between the reproduction of
function systems and a "comprehensive rationality of world society."12
"This requires massive interventions," he says, most effective when they
"are translated into self-limiting impulses and transformed into a
regime constitution." 13 I would ask this question: How would we know
that tipping points have been reached and that destructive energies can
no longer be tolerated? What societal register would carry that
message? Not just from Marx, but from Polanyi too, we know that the
market system has had a series of massive collisions with society, and
what, in Marx's analysis of capitalism's early clearing exercise of
"primitive accumulation," is a history of pillage, exaction, and
devastation, Polanyi describes as the radical disembedding of the
market system from the society that harbored it, a violent extraction
that marks social devastation. Worlds have been lost in these collisions,
and not only was no "tipping point" reached or registered, but in some
cases, in the colonial context for example, there is not even a trace of the
language that the vanquished used to describe the loss of their worlds.
That is all to say that functional subsystems outlive catastrophic events.
In which case, "tipping point" disasters are reintegrated into
business-as-usual, giving those responsible for the crisis yet another
financial instrument to play with, recycling catastrophe into the vortex
10. Teubner, supra note 2.
11. Gunther Teubner, Constitutionalizing Polycontexturality, 20 SOc. & LEGAL STUD.
210, 210-29 (2011).
12. Id. at 225.
13. Id.
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of profit as another toxic commodity to be sold. We witness a
functionalization in the direction of new systemic operations and a
renewed impetus. This is too depressing and familiar a point to develop
at any length. It is also an argument that resonates all too disturbingly
with how systems "think."14 Take the Europe 2020 Strategy put forward
by the European Commission as successor to the 2000 Lisbon Strategy,
setting out a vision of Europe's social market economy for the twenty-
first century. The strategy aspires to "show how the EU can come out
stronger from the economic crisis and how it can be turned into a smart,
sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of
employment, productivity and social cohesion."15
If crisis is an opportunity to "come out stronger," then we need a
different word to describe the situation in Greece, where the cases of
HIV rose by over 1000 percent in the first six months of 2012 in Athens,
where Greece's already anemic health budget was slashed by 40 percent
last year, and where public suicides are regularly reported in the media.
This first caveat is merely an invitation not to be hasty in
envisaging paradigm shifts; capitalism has proven extraordinarily
resilient in the past. Perhaps the only thing that might usher in radical
change will do so not because it is read (and reacted to) by the paradigm
it challenges but precisely because it cannot be. But that is a different
argument. For now let us just say this: as is always the case in the
deployment of collective categories, the notion of a collective "hitting the
bottom" is both over- and under-inclusive. The crisis is a catastrophe for
the lives and livelihoods only of some. There are indeed many who are
angry (references in the literature abound to Durkheim's "col~re
publique"), but there are also those who remain largely untouched or
even who have profited from the crisis. And then, of course, there are
those who are well past the "tipping point," for whom it is already too
late.
B. State Phobia
Here is a short extract from Foucault's 1979 series of lectures at the
Collage de France:
Against this the inflationary critique of the state,
against this kind of laxness, I would like to suggest some
14. Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Towards a Constructivist Epistemology of
Law, 23 L. & Soc. REV. 727 (1989).
15. As per Jos6 Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission. See Europe
2020, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index-en.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2013).
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theses . . . In the first place there is the thesis that the
welfare state has neither the same form, of course nor, it
seems to me, the same root or origin as the totalitarian
state, as the Nazi, fascist or Stalinist state. I would also
like to suggest that the characteristic feature of the state
we call totalitarian is far from being the endogenous
intensification and extension of the mechanisms of the
state; [the totalitarian state] is not at all the exaltation
but rather the limitation, a reduction and a
subordination of the autonomy of the state, of its
specificity and its specific functioning . . . in relation to
something else, which is the party.16
While Teubner too identifies the role of the party as key to
"totalitarian societal constitutions"17 and remains ambivalent rather
than damning the "precarious balance" attempted by the welfare state, 18
there surfaces in the later work a certain impatience with forms of
direct steering by the state of "social suborders" that too quickly turns to
a rejection of "statist" societal constitutionalism. With the shadow of
totalitarianism rarely far away, a certain phobia displaces a more
careful scrutiny over the threshold of appropriate steering. In any case,
let us not too hastily give up faith in the state as an instrument of
steering; otherwise societal constitutionalism can too easily turn into a
dystopia with consumer activity substituting for democratic engagement
and the public sphere a version of Walmart writ large.
C. Polanyi and the 'Double Movement"
"In the long run, [] the one-sided 'neo-liberal' reduction of global
constitutionalism to its constitutive function cannot be sustained. It is
only a matter of time before the systemic energies released trigger
disastrous consequences. . . . This is the moment when Polanyi's 'double
movement' makes its presence felt."19 Polanyi, as is well known, does
indeed identify a reactive double movement at what Teubner calls the
"tipping point," with social forces storming the market to reverse the
radical disembedding of the economy from society.20 But what would
"disembedding" mean under conditions of functional differentiation?
16. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLtGE DE
FRANCE 190 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2008).
17. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 21-23.
18. Id. at 24-26.
19. Id. at 78.
20. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
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Where will society draw the resources for that storming with the
purchase point for a society-wide response dispersed and with its ability
to respond to market excess undone? In what modality would society
"collect" itself, and what form of action would its response take? These
are important concerns and they make recourse to Polanyi hugely
problematic. Let me lay out two of these concerns because they relate
directly to the "societal" portion of "societal constitutionalism." For
Polanyi, there is a significant continuity between functional
differentiation and what he identifies as the "disembedding" of the
economy from society. And perhaps that is why Polanyi is not the most
obvious ally for those that see the problem only at the threshold at
which functional differentiation has gone too far. At a certain threshold
of functional differentiation, significantly lower than what we take now
as "hitting the bottom," societies withdraw meaningful symbols that
gather social meanings, value systems, or constitutive commitments;
values under conditions of differentiation are too poorly selective
(Luhmann also says this) to sustain identifications and inform
commitments that sustain "embeddedness."
Where to place the threshold? The difference that Polanyi
emphasizes, as is well known, is that between the market and the
market system. Throughout history, economies have involved markets:
the Great Transformation's early chapters are dedicated to describing
embedded forms of market activity.21 The monumental shift comes with
the creation of markets in land, labor, and money. It is the generation of
markets in these three "fictitious commodities" and the articulation of
these three markets that create the market system and the great
transformation. The dubious achievement of this articulation is the
collapse of the notion of the political economy into its market form. The
generalization of the logic of the commodity across spheres so vital to
societies marks the moment of disembedding. It is important to focus on
this complementarity above all, the facets of the articulation, and the
destructive commodification that propels itself forward through these
linkages. From a systems perspective, although I cannot develop this
hypothesis further, it is the creation of a market in money, and its
articulation with the other two dimensions of marketization, that allows
the "hypercyclical" linkage 22 and self-referential closure of the economic
system as market system, differentiated because it is disembedded from
society, and as undercutting the political economy. So, and this is my
second concern, the optimism is misplaced that somehow social forces
will come to the rescue again to rein in the more radical and
21. Id.
22. For the notion of the "hypercycle" and its role in the self-referential closure of
autopoietic systems, see GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 25 (1993).
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catastrophic aspects of the disembedding of its economy that have left
society denuded, stripped of all protections. "Polanyi very pertinently
defines socialism as the subordination of the economy to society and of
economic goals to the societal goals which encompass them and assign
them their subordinate place as means to an end."23 All of which points
to the observation that we should simply concede that Polanyi is an
unlikely ally for societal constitutionalism. His is ultimately an
argument grounded in solidarity as irreducible ground. As Europe
watches over the pauperization of its peoples at its periphery with
renewed dispatches of austerity measures, is anyone really under any
illusions over what economic solidarity meant and means to the
European Union? And if for a moment we assume the European Union's
oversight is benign, what forces of solidarity could be marshaled under
current conditions of functional differentiation? While Polanyi's
diagnosis-of the disembedding of the economy from European
society-is painfully relevant, his prescription is painfully unavailable.
With these caveats in place, we now turn to the concept of
"transnational societal constitutionalism" to ask questions of each of its
terms, as they articulate together.
II. UPLOADING THE TRANSNATIONAL
"Globalization," says Teubner,
above all means that functional differentiation, first
realized historically within the nation states of Europe
and North Africa, now encompasses the whole world.
Certainly not all subsystems have globalized
simultaneously, with the same speed and intensity.
Religion, science and the economy are well established
as global systems, while politics and law still remain
mainly focused on the nation state.24
Teubner further states, "[T]he staggered nature of globalisation
produces a tension between the self-foundation of autonomous global
social systems and their political-legal constitutionalization." 25
Teubner raises the question of this "tension" to point out that the
"constellation" that was possible in the nation-state between law,
23. ANDRE GORZ, CRITIQUE OF ECONoMic REAsON 130 (Gillian Handyside & Chris
Turner trans., Verso 1989) (1988).
24. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 42.
25. Id. at 43 (emphasis omitted).
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politics, and the regulated field (subsystem) has come undone; that
there is "no counterpart" to it "in the global context"; and that "global
self-foundation and national constitutionalization-the global economic
and the national political, for example--are irrevocably drifting apart."26
The answer to such an irrevocable development can only be for the
global function systems to develop their own constitutions. As we will
see, legal structures will have a role to play in this. "But . . . the
discrepancy between globally established social subsystems and a
politics stuck at inter-state level" can only lead to "the constitutional
totality break[ing] apart" to be "replaced by a form of constitutional
fragmentation."27 "The comprehensive structural coupling" that
Luhmann famously identified in the constitutions of nation-states in
modernity, "clearly has no equivalent at the level of world society." 28 We
have instead a "new phenomenon: the self-constitutionalization of global
orders without a state."29 There are benefits and risks in the new
constellation and the distancing between "societal" and "state
constitutions." Less marked by a dependency on "the power of states,
state policies and the ideologies of political parties," societal
constitutions will inevitably, however, be tightly coupled to "interest
constellations within the global fragments." In a positive vein, this
"should result in a greater responsiveness to social needs than the
constitutional law laid down by state authorities."30 The risk, on the
other hand, is that an excessively close coupling of societal constitutions
to "partial interests" may lead to "corrupt" constitutional norms. It
remains to be seen, says Teubner, whether countervailing influences
from institutions and civil society will balance out the risk of corruption,
though that is very much the normative drift of his argument. 31 This is
an important question, and the book lends significant insight to it. But,
for now, I will not move in that direction. Instead, I want to stay here
with the diagnosis that there is no equivalent of the constitutional, as a
coupling of politics and law, at the global level; with the identification of
what might replace it at the global level; and with the assumption that
with the new societal form of "self-constitutionalisation of global
orders," the constitutional function might be uploaded from national to
global level. If the emphasis here is on constitutional function as
definitive of what it is to have a constitution, it is because Teubner's is,
too. We are working here with functional definitions and
26. Id. at 44.
27. Id. at 51.
28. Id. at 52.
29. Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted).
30. Id. at 54.
31. Id.
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understandings of the constitutional, with other possible, previous
defining coordinates having come adrift. There are two ways to
understand the modality by which the constitutional might be uploaded
to the global level. One involves the language of generalization and
respecification. The other, typical of functional analysis, involves
looking at what functional equivalents (to the national constitution)
uphold functional differentiation and the autonomy of social systems at
the global level, crucially in respect of both their separateness and their
connectedness, the latter in terms of mutual cognitive adaptability and
coevolution. Let us look at both in turn. The uses of the dialectic of
generalization and respecification-as the modality of abstracting and
uploading the constitutional-mainly regard the use of fundamental
rights. To explain the dynamic of the emergence of fundamental rights
for the "world society," Teubner asks what elements might be
generalized from the tradition of nation-state constitutionalism that
might be respecified in the global context of advanced functional
differentiation.
Generalizations are of course as much selective suppressions as they
are selective actualizations. The "reflexivity" of the system navigates
what is suppressed and what is actualized in the uploading of rights to
the global level, through the double movement of generalization (away
from the context of the nation-state) and respecification (as appropriate
to the receiving fields). What guides this reflexivity is the handling of
the tension between what is generalizable as constitutional (categorical,
transcendent) and what is appropriate framing, sensitive to the
self-production of the field.32
Of course, Teubner will rightly insist that the "constitutional
emptiness of the transnational is a false assumption."8 What
exaggerates the claims to constitutional novelty is that "an equivalent to
the constitutional subject of the nation state is not so easily recognizable
at the transnational level."34 But in a space populated by new
"assemblages, configurations and ensembles," the relevant
constitutional question is whether these "exhibit sustainable analogies
to the nation state" in terms of constituent power, collective
32. I have suggested elsewhere that it is impossible to negotiate this tension. It
immediately folds into self-reference and then collapses into the second pole, in the sense
that re-specification overdetermines what might be generalizable in the first place.
Emilios Christodoulidis, Of Boundaries and "Tipping Points": A Response to Gunther
Teubner, 20 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 238, 240 (2011).
33. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 7.
34. Id. at 8.
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self-definition decision-making and organization. 35 "Generalization" and
"respecification" are key to tracking the sustainable analogies.
Teubner has developed these ideas in an argument that circumvents
many of the difficulties surrounding "horizontality" and the efforts of
deploying human rights to curb the power of private actors in the global
field.36 And he is surely right in the limiting function he attributes
(elsewhere) to human-rights-constitutionalism, as a compensatory (my
term, not his) constitutionalism, with human rights simply existing as
markers of excess, signs that the ordinary operations of the system have
imposed social costs beyond a threshold of what the system deems
bearable, or that it can usefully externalize. 37 I will not delve into it
further because with Constitutional Fragments, the ambition has been
raised to a full-blown theory of reflexive constitutionalization. The
reflexivity is geared to the maintenance of proper boundaries, of a
balance of the constitutive and the limitative such that the sphere of
autonomy of social subsystems is maximized and functional
differentiation is secured at the global level. Remember that it was the
asymmetry, or staggering, between systems that went global (economy)
and systems that haven't (legal, political) that the new fragmentary
constitutionalization is called on to redress in a way that might
replicate the balances and proper limits secured by "functional
differentiation, first realised historically within the nation states of
Europe," now on the global scale. If functional differentiation was
sustained through a system of structural couplings, a coevolution
through a complex logic of linkage between autopoietic systems, the
endeavor now is to replicate such complex couplings at the global level
where certain systems lag behind in terms of what systems theorists
call "performance," i.e., their impact on other systems in the direction of
securing the overall reproduction of society.
Yet, this endeavor stumbles on what is, at least prima facie,
problematic about uploading the familiar pattern of mutual irritation
and adjustment from the national to the supranational level. It is
precisely the effect of the asymmetry between the economy and the
legal-political complex, in other words, between the transnationalization
of markets and that of states. This asymmetry is not contingent, a
lagging behind that can be accelerated and brought up to speed, but is
instead structurally built-in to the architecture of global capitalism. In
the case of Europe, the asymmetry shows in the unevenness of the
integration of national markets (through the fast-tracking of economic
35. Id.
36. Id. at 124-49.
37. Gunther Teubner, The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by "Private"
Transnational Actors, 69 MOD. L. REV. 327, 329-30 (2006).
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integration) as against the fragmentation of states' systems of social
protection. At the level of "world society," it is seen in the hugely
successful creation of "global turbo-capitalism" against the
multifragmented processes of political transnationalization. In each
case, the asymmetry is vital and productive for the integration of capital
and the extraction of profit.
Let us look at this in systems-theoretical terms. The effect of the
asymmetry is the uneven distribution of "irritation-capacity" between
the economic and political systems at the global level: economics
overwhelm, politics underwhelm. The transnational is already largely
colonized by the economic logic it is supposed to "impact" on. The idea
that an (economically-colonized) transnational system, whose very logic
of connectivity (the "trans" of the transnational) plays out that of
competition and comparative advantage, might nevertheless act to rein
in what sustains it is in fact paradoxical. We are depressingly familiar
with the ways in which the transnational is organized along the lines of
managing "preparedness for the market"-through the "un-protecting"
of labor, the suppression of wages and undercutting of trade unionism,
the rolling back of the main costs of labor reproduction back onto labor,
the abiding by World Bank governance manuals, and the rest. The
relation between capital and states is crucial here, and the asymmetry
propels the creation of margins of profit in terms of the "race to the
bottom," where social protection afforded by states is a cost and where
any attempt to hoist that protection above the national level (social
chapter, social charter, social rights, social dialogue) is systematically
undercut (when it was not so toothless in the first place as to merit
attention). Spectacularly here, more than any other sphere of legal
thinking, the reflexivity of the legal and political systems is
short-circuited back into the market paradigm by taking for granted the
"redundancy" of "codetermination" as an organizing principle of
production and by replacing the "old ways" of thinking about labor with
optimizing the regulation of the labor market, at best through an
enhancement of "capabilities." For the most part, labor lawyers appear
incapable of thinking past labor market optimization. Relations between
core and peripheral states are a vital part of the "rationalization" of the
transnational, an edifice which is premised on power asymmetries. In
the meantime, the systematic pauperization of the periphery-its
asphyxiation under austerity-daily jettisons large numbers of skilled
and semi-skilled workers into what used to be called the reserve pool of
the unemployed to compete for casual labor with the ever-increasing
flows of illegal immigrant labor. The pattern is generalized across the
board, always driven by the demand of maximization of financial
returns, and in each case respecified to the institutional logic of the
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field. In his discussion of the "self-constitutionalization" of international
organizations, Teubner picks the World Trade Organization (WTO) as
"[o]ne well-known example [ofj constitutional emancipation."38 Here
constitutionalization takes, among other "directions," that of giving
"priority of trade rules over political principles" and of "direct effect."39
The word "emancipation" is interesting here especially, as it consists of
separating off the autonomous field of "trade rules" from "political
principles." This "emancipation," which is undoubtedly a moment of
"self-constitutionalization," entails the progressive dismantling of labor
protection as an unavoidable effect of the global organization of trade
that circumvents any possible municipal safeguards. A key moment of
the "emancipation" is the Singapore summit of 1998, at which the WTO
washed its hands of any involvement in labor disputes, thus relieving
the regulation of international trade of its effect on the world's
producers. But as we know, and Alain Supiot puts it pointedly,
industrial relations, social protection, and employment and
unemployment levels, among others, depend much more on the
organization of international trade than on the policies of national
governments, which, he argues, paradoxically makes the effectiveness of
the protection of collective rights inversely proportionate to job security:
those who need them most are effectively deprived of any recourse to
them.40 Many of these examples can be discussed further, or explained
otherwise or away, and the assessment of what political publics on the
global scale might achieve cannot and should not be underestimated:
global economic action inevitably generates global constituencies of
addressees, and therefore also global challenges. Teubner returns to
these themes often. He writes, for example, that
the dismantling of national barriers and an explicit
policy of deregulation led to a . .. global financial market
constitution that set free uncontrolled dynamics. . . .
Only with the near catastrophe we have experienced
does it appear that collective learning processes will in
future seek constitutional limitations.41
I think this is important. But I am left with the question: If
"learning processes" are indeed inaugurated, what precisely is to be
learned at the constitutional level? Because if, as I have argued, the
38. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 55 (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Alain Supiot, Law and Labour: A World of Market Norms?, 39 NEW LEFT REV. 109
(2006).
41. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 11.
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asymmetry that is key to "uploading" from national to transnational is
structural and constitutive, then the learning processes can only take
the form of pure negativity. If, that is, the logic of global capitalist
expansion, as race to the bottom, pits the economic against the political
systems, then the learning process can only assume the form of
anticapitalist struggle. And I cannot imagine that this is what
transnational societal constitutionalism would embrace as political
prescription.
In any case, and whatever the meaning of "learning" in this context,
my aim in this section was to identify an asymmetry that is constitutive
of the logic of extraction of surplus value under conditions of
globalization, and thus structural, and to insist on the consequence this
has for systems theoretical analysis, namely that the thesis of mutual
cognitive adaptability between systems relied on a symmetry that is
now buried under a different principle of organization or differentiation.
The problem is that the generalization of the political beyond the
nation-state, the move from national to transnational politics, is
significantly impacted upon, if not actually organized, by the economic
logic it will then be called on to mitigate. The different logics of political
and economic systems, whose mutual autonomy and reciprocal
"irritability" is seen as that which maintains differentiation, and which
is undercut at the transnational level since the political system at that
level does not replicate the logic of state action but instead, the
economic system, having successfully harnessed the state to a system of
global competition, simply "exploits" it in the direction of its own
aggressive expansion. Let us thus raise a doubt over the uploading of
the "mutual irritability" thesis from the national to the supranational
level. We will see later what key problem the "organizing asymmetry,"
as I have developed it above, causes at the metalevel of reflexivity at
which we are invited to think though the regenerative impetus of
societal constitutionalism. With this, we move in the next section from
the "transnational" to the "constitutional" of "transnational societal
constitutionalism"; the last of the three terms, the "societal," we will
address in the final section.
III. THE PITFALLS OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
"The agenda of transnational constitutionalism" involves not the
"creation," but "rather the fundamental transformation of a pre-existing
constitutional order."42 My question here involves the temporal
dimension and the idea of "constitutionalization" as an emergent
42. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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constitutional reality of the interplay, at the global level, of systemic
logics to mutually limitative effect.
The learning processes with which we ended the previous section
are a key aspect of the logic of societal constitutionalism, which captures
something that is crucial: its reactive mode. The absence of a
comprehensive coupling of politics and law at the global level results in
forms of "constitutional fragmentation" where "occasional couplings can
be seen as and when social problems demand. Constitutional norms are
developed ad hoc when a current conflict assumes constitutional
dimensions and requires constitutional decisions." 43 "When global
problems are building up within global sectors, social conflicts emerge
that result in individual legal norms of a constitutional quality. These
norms then become aggregated, over time, into the constitutions of the
subsystems of world society."44
What to make of constitutionalization as reactive, the constitutional
curiosity that is this incremental, aggregative, fragmentary process of
becoming constitutional? I will identify in this section a certain tension
in the argument about constitutionalization. On the one hand, I identify
dangers that are insufficiently rebutted of a constitutionalization that
appears as nothing but an a posteriori (incremental, fragmentary,
aggregative, and so on) sanctioning of economic processes. On the other,
I want to identify the resources that exist within the theory itself for
resisting this appropriation of constitutional language, where the
appropriation results in the buttressing and redeeming of global
processes of capital accumulation. After all, "learning" does not occur in
the receiving mode only; it involves a certain invariability of structures
of expectations, as well, in terms of which information is received. It is
in the selective yield of such expectation structures that learning occurs.
It is here, above all, that we can identify the locus of a specifically
constitutional reflexivity.
In the second chapter of his ground-breaking treatise Social
Systems, Niklas Luhmann identifies three dimensions-social, material,
and temporal-to all "meaning" constructed in social systems. 45 Taking
the cue from him, I will suggest three dimensions of the meaning of
"constitutional." In the social dimension, the question is over the subject
that the constitution names; in the temporal dimension, the question is
over the constitution's ability to recruit the past in its
expectation-binding operation for the future; in the material dimension,
the question is over the threshold of unity that would gather the legal
43. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 53.
45. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 59-102 (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baecker
trans., Stan. U. Press 1995) (1984) (explaining the three dimensions).
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system as a meaningful whole. These are threshold requirements for
ascribing constitutional meaning because we associate with the
constitution the constitutive functions of providing unity for the legal
system, normatively binding certain key expectations for the future, and
naming the subject of popular sovereignty. In this sense, they underpin
and subtend any form of constitutional reflexivity. And it is under this
prism that we need to look first at the dangers of constitutionalization
as reactive, then at the promise, perhaps, of a selective, reflexive
constitutionalization that crucially preempts and immunizes society
from the more toxic effects of a runaway economy.46
The question for constitutionalization as a learning process, and as
reactive, poses this problem for the "constitutional." If the term
constitutional connotes the framing function I suggested and the
constitution connotes a system of metarules that sanction systemic
operations and frame the contours of what can be contested
meaningfully therein, what does it mean to talk of constitutionalization
as an ongoing process? And what does it mean to talk of
constitutionalization at the transnational level, where constitutional
functions appear to be distributed between the two levels, or claimed at
both, with no jurisdiction over the distribution? If constitutionalism
traditionally denotes a certain articulation of the political and the legal,
where might one look now for the political register within
constitutionalization, with the weakening or collapse of political
opportunities of framing or intervention? Constitutionalization thus
appears to beg the question on two important fronts, which is significant
because it is constitutive of the constitutional in two directions,
externally and internally. In the case of the legal system, the "external"
dimension involves the articulation or coupling of the legal and the
political; what appears to be begging the question about the coupling is
that the political is not given expression to except a posteriori, and
therefore, it appears as both condition and product of "its" coupling to
law. The second involves the fundamental question of what gives law its
systemic nature; in this context, it is question-begging to assume the
hierarchization of jurisdiction or the framing function as taking place a
posteriori. Let us stay with this internal dimension.
The usual way out of these conceptual problems is recourse to one or
another form of constitutional pluralism. But to call a constitutional
order plural is, at least prima facie, contradictory. As Chris Thornhill
thoughtfully put it in a recent critical review of theories of
constitutional pluralism, the constitution is, after all, the "point of final
46. In the author's opinion, Teubner would not limit the discussion to the control of the
economic system alone.
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normative regress" in the system.47 Such regress is what the systemic
requires, and the systemic is the distinctive feature of the legal order.
Even in the context of the common law and its insistence on the virtues
of the ad hoc and the pragmatic, its most celebrated theorist, Herbert
Hart, introduces the constitutional distinction between primary and
secondary rules as constitutive of what it means to have a legal system.
If he defines law as the "union of primary and secondary rules,"4 8 it is
because secondary rules, rules of recognition, of validity, of change, and
of jurisdiction, grant the body of rules their systematic character:
recognition ultimately gathers the fragments (the disparate rules at the
various levels at which they are instantiated) as one corpus,
hierarchically structured and, in that sense only, rational. This
rationality-as-systematicity finds its apogee in Kelsen. In both cases,
and across the vast range that stretches between these two extreme
positions, law is defined through its systematicity-its ultimate points
of regress, the "rule of recognition," the Grundnorm, the basic
constitutional principles-and thus against "plurality."
Of course "constitutionalization is a social process and only
secondarily a legal process"; the great novelty of the theory is to
withdraw any primacy of the legal. But, even as set adrift from the legal
system, the meaning of the constitutional points to a certain function of
"containment" along the social, temporal, and material axes mentioned
above. These are threshold requirements for ascribing constitutional
meaning. Uploaded to the level of "transnational societal
constitutionalism," they become unsettled, as they become subject to a
number of extraordinary reconfigurations in all three dimensions. In the
"social dimension," because no constitutional subject can be ascribed as
locus and agent of constituent power, the subject is fashioned out of the
process itself, in a kind of backward projection; the a posteriori dynamic
ascribes subjecthood to an actor as configured through the process,
except no "fabulous retroactivity" looks capable of securing any
semblance of such a subject along the spectra of transnational
fragmentation of publics, or at least not yet.4 9 In the temporal
47. Chris Thornhill, Legal Pluralism: The Many Books on Europe's Many Constitutions,
21 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 413, 420 (2012).
48. HERBERT HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
49. To take this further: If no "demos" can be currently identified as subject of the
process, the promise of an ever-closer union will deliver that subject. In a more speculative
language, Jacques Derrida spoke of the "fabulous retroactivity" of such an operation of the
future-anterior, and in theoretically less exciting, though no less exalted terms, Joseph
Weiler speaks of the European project's messianic character. There is every reason to be
more cautious in the current conjuncture. And yet, crisis-prone, bereft of ideals, limping
from social to democratic deficit and back, driven by a vision of economic growth without
economic solidarity, and somehow despite its best theorists' best efforts, the European
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dimension, one encounters no framing function, and, startlingly, no
actual need for one: rather, all that is needed is a gradual solidification
of what the process produces, constitutionalization, the depositing of
constitutional "fragments." In the "material dimension," finally, one
encounters a slow incremental process that reconfigures the identity of
the system as the system goes on.
The example of European integration, a clear example of
constitutionalization as an ongoing process, is a particularly worrying
illustration of the danger of the undoing of the constitutional. Not that
one would know that from the constitutional literature on the European
Union! In fact, if the endeavor to fashion a constitutional project for
Europe has involved an extraordinary effort as well as a series of much
debated significant failures, constitutionalization has granted it a less
explicit, if spurious, success. In the absence of any kind of leverage that
the project might have gained from its various "constitutional
moments," remarkable chiefly for being so remarkably anemic, theorists
of European law have compensated for the absence of any recognizable
expression of pouvoir constituant at the European level with novel
theoretical constructions replete with functional equivalences. A
dubious stretching of the constitutional imaginary has been largely
successful in redefining the terms of the debate. The "European
Constitution," directly defeated on political occasions, becomes
associated increasingly with a slow incremental process of capital
accumulation and a generalization of social protection as harnessed to
the logic of competition, increasingly, in the current more ruthless
phase of its acceleration, as comparative advantage. These are
contingent developments, and there is no reason to generalize one's
disillusionment with the European adventure to all cases of
transnational constitutionalism. What they do illustrate, however, are
the dangers we encounter with constitutionalization as a process of
"becoming constitutional," the conditions of that process, and the
criteria of ascription of constitutionality. But if my argument in this
section aims to raise the theoretical question over
"constitutionalization" as problematic from a constitutional point of
view, it is also to identify key resources in the theory, whereby the
constitutional project now appears to have been extraordinarily successful in fashioning
itself as a constitutional settlement a posteriori. The name it gives the process of this
"settlement" is constitutionalization. The name it gives to the radical disagreements that
beset it is pluralism. In another paper, I argue that both constitutionalization and
pluralism develop in tandem with, or even become locked into, processes of market
expansion and recalibration that retain no connection to the democratic impulse that
animated the constitutional discourse of the European project. See Emilios
Christodoulidis, A Minefield of Misreckonings: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism, 14
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EuR. L. 119 (2012).
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reflexive "constitutional" element within "societal constitutionalism" is
deployed in the direction of a certain limitation of the generalization of
economic value.
In a hugely suggestive reference to Reinhard Koselleck early in the
book, Teubner directs us to the important question whether there is any
significant distinction to be drawn between constitutionalization and
(mere) juridification? What draws Teubner to Koselleck is the latter's
attempt to "liberate constitutionalism from its limitation to the state
and to extend it to all institutions of society."50 For us, what is of key
importance is not that, but the following qualification Koselleck
introduces: "constitutionalism should include all those institutions
governed by law .. . without which a political community is incapable of
political action." Note the constitutive connection here between the
constitutional, political community, and political action. For Teubner,
Koselleck "leaves open" the question: "[W]hat is the difference between
the constitutionalisation of civil society institutions and their mere
juridification?" He answers it in this way: "In contrast to the simple
juridification of social sub-areas, we may only speak of their
constitutionalisation once legal norms have assumed the dual
function . . . of the foundation of autonomous orders and their self-
limitation."5 1 Like Koselleck, Teubner is concerned here with the
invigoration of the institutions of civil society, what an older tradition of
pluralism identifies as intermediate associations between society and
state, and what Teubner defends in the name of functional
differentiation: how the autonomy of spheres might be guaranteed; how
their imperialist tendencies might be reined in; and how, given both the
above, social integration may still be possible. 52
This provides an answer to the danger associated with
constitutionalization: that "self-descriptions," generalizations, and other
emerging concepts and rules are merely aggregation rules or simply
aggregations of rules whose constitutional function comes too late. They
are gathering rationalizations that lack the constitutional qualities of
being able to perform a framing function or a review function, that is,
the hallmarks of the "constitutional" function, all of which would have
required them to preexist the instance of their application. If, instead,
the constitutional is to retain anything of the "constituent"-political
dimension, of a society's ability to act on what the various spheres,
regimes, or fields might present as the necessary logic of their
self-production, then constitutionalization needs to be pitted against
juridification, as it needs to be pitted against the generalization of
50. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 16.
51. Id. at 18.
52. See id. at 20.
649
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
economic reason. The very possibility of pitting anything against
anything else, of setting up any set of "rationalities" as oppositional,
involves resisting the enfolding of any injunction from the one into the
logic of the other receiving system. In other words, it involves the
capacity of a society to draw political distinctions and present political
injunctions, and that is precisely what the dynamic of a creeping
constitutionalization undercuts. And yet this is precisely what Koselleck
insists on, and further insists on identifying as essentially
constitutional: "constitutionalism should include all those institutions
governed by law . .. without which a political community is incapable of
political action."
So with this we are at the heart of the ambivalence and the crux of
the tension between constitutionalization as a reactive moment and
constitutionalization as a reflexive moment. It is not enough here to
argue that the two fall neatly on either side of the dialectic between
internal and external politicization, because it is precisely the assumed
"dialectic" underwriting the passage from external to internal that
elides the tension and the opposition. If the injunction to protect the
dignity of workers is nonnegotiable, then what would it mean to subject
it to the criteria of internal politicization of the economic system,
however loudly we proclaim that it should be done to protect the public
interest, since economic reason cannot but operationalize arguments in
terms of the exchange value of labor? We will say more about this in the
final section. For now, let us simply repeat the problems relating to
constitutionalization.
The danger of constitutionalization as self-limitation is that its
success in underpinning the internal processes and keeping them in
check is a contingent result of the emerging framing rather than its
condition. If constitutionalization is merely the name of what "hardens"
into concepts that acquire some form of orientation value for the system
in response to societal stimuli (be they protests or conflicts) as it surges
on along the trajectory of its self-reproduction, then we sacrifice the
possibility to draw distinctions on a political-societal register. In the
face of this surrender, and as the subsumption of value to the partial
rationalities of the systems continues unabated, we should not be
prepared to grace the institutional facilitation of the all too predictable
trajectories of capital accumulation with the term constitutional.
But there is a second reading of constitutionalization that can be
rescued from this fate. We find it developed in its complexity and
intricacy in the fourth chapter of Constitutional Fragments,53 and I will
visit it at greater length in the next section. On this reading, the
53. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 73.
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constitutional imports a reflexivity that does not immediately yield to
the functional imperatives of the economy, and the processes of learning
remain fixed to a different normative register-I would call it political
in a broader sense. This alone might hoist constitutional reflexivity out
of the internal dynamics of partial rationalities and into a protective
(limitative) role for society. From a systems-theoretical perspective, it is
a highly difficult opposition for reflexivity to navigate between the
normative and the functional. What purchase point exists for the
"limitative" in the differentiated, centrifugal processes of social
reproduction? What pivot exists for a reflexivity that might reflect on
proper boundaries? What thresholds and benchmarks exist for that
"proper" other than "functional," and what criteria exist for functional
other than systemic equilibria that come in the form of "requisite
variety" and other successful forms of bringing complexity under
control? If any of these questions are to be answered in the direction of
securing a "limitative" constitutional moment, then constitutional
reflexivity must identify the point at which the system must yield before
different sets of values or contract back to its proper limits. This would
require a normative rather than a functional register, and, ingenious as
Teubner's attempt is to run these as congruent and to navigate
normativity via functional considerations, I cannot see how anything
but a political reflexivity can secure society's protection from functional
logics running amok.
IV. THE LEVELING LOGIC OF FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE
A strengthened politics of reflection is required within
the economy, and this has to be supported by
constitutional norms. Historically it was collective
bargaining, co-determination and the right to strike
which enabled new forms of societal dissensus. In today's
transnational organisations ethical committees fulfil
[sic] a similar role. Societal constitutionalism sees its
point of application wherever it turns the existence of a
variety of 'reflection centres' within society, and in
particular within economic institutions, into the
criterion of a democratic society.54
Let us unpack the various elements of this formulation. Examples
that Teubner gives of such instantiations (or "centers") of reflection are:
political "activist" shopping ("the politicisation of the consumer"), "the
54. Teubner, supra note 2, at 17 (emphasis added).
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ecologisation of corporate governance," and "plain money." What these
examples share is that they allow systems to channel societal responses
to their expansion in the direction of their own self-limitation. This
"auto-limitative role . . . leads to the generation of powerful
counter-structures: the limitation of power by power, money by money;
in each case the system-specific medium turns against itself."5 5 Take
"plain money reforms," for example. "Plain money aims at the centre of
the economic constitution because it configures-constitutes-the
self-limitation mechanisms of the economy . . . it does not attempt to
regulate the economy by means of political power, legal rules, moral
imperative, [and] discursive persuasion."5 6
These instances tap into broader and vastly richer resources of
social dynamism. The first thing that the theory of societal
constitutionalism brings to the fore is the interconnectedness of
systemic phenomena with the underlying social dynamics as expressed
in "constitutional arenas." Social conflicts, social movements, and social
demands trigger at the subsystemic level processes that cannot be
ignored, and to which institutional "solutions" offer nothing but
temporary respite. The second thing to note, apart from the societal
shadowing the subsystemic, is that subsystems react to contradictory
dynamics building up within them. It is to alleviate such contradictory
developments that constitutional reflexivity develops, as we will see,
with the support of the legal system. In that sense, the "medial
reflexivity" described above ("the limitation of power by power, money
by money") is not yet constitutionalization; self-constitution is not yet
constitutionalization. It is in need of further support. It only becomes
"constitutional" in the form of a metacoupling, as supported by the
reflexivity of law. As Teubner puts it:
What is the reason, though, why secondary legal rules
are supplementing social reflexivity? Law comes into the
self-foundation processes of social systems when they
cannot fully accomplish their autonomy. This happens
either when the social system cannot be adequately
closed by its own first-order and second-order
operations, or when reflexive social processes are unable
to stabilize themselves or, especially, when they are
becoming paralyzed by their paradoxes. In such cases,
additional closure mechanisms come in to support the
self-foundation of social autonomy. The law is one of
55. Id.
56. Id. at 16.
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them-not the only one, but one among several. The
self-description of "state" acts as one of these closure
mechanisms: The political system is only differentiable
at all when it describes itself as a state.57
We will come back to this. For now, let us stay with what is
troubling in the first extract that connects "reflection centers,"
"dissensus," and "democracy," not for the rather anemic opportunities
that such instantiations of reflection such as activist shopping and
"corporate social responsibility" present to the overpowering growth
compulsions of the economy, but for the articulation of the notion of
dissensus and the connection with democracy. The first and most
troubling dimension is the logic of functional equivalence that it instills.
"Reflection centers" are not democratic per se (that presumably would
be submitting the economic to the political), but are functionally
equivalent to democratic processes. Where "historically it was
co-determination" that checked the growth compulsions of capitalist
accumulation, now a "similar role"-functionally equivalent-is played
by ethical committees in organizations.5 8 The "growth compulsions" of
modern corporate structures may be tempered by "external pressures"
from political actors, but it is always the corporate structure that
receives and deals with the democratic imperative or dissensus
opportunity.
There are therefore none of the values that would have been
engendered through the irreducible and incommensurable (therefore not
functionally interchangeable) value of democratic participation (and
contribution to social labor). Teubner, at times, appears to suggest that
it would be a "category error" to "apply the decision models for politics,
untested, to other social sectors," because it would install a "politics-led
integration of diverging rationalities by imposing on them an internal
'political' constitution," and "wrongly politiciz[ing]" them.5 9 In any case,
with the democratic (or at least with collective) decision-making
relegated to the political system, we are left with functionally
equivalent mechanisms; and through equivalence traverses merely a
logic of instrumentality, of what opens up the space for productive,
useful dissensus. This usefulness, again, will be measured in terms of
what is conducive to maintaining proper balances between function
systems, not in terms of the irreducible value of democracy. As we now
move on to the much more complex argument about reflexivity and
constitutionalization that Teubner offers us, let us retain from this
57. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 107.
58. Teubner, supra note 2, at 17.
59. Id. at 28-29.
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interim objection the distinction between the implicit and instrumental
value of democracy and, for strategic purposes, the distinction between
productive and incongruent dissensus. (I have suggested some uses for
the latter in my Strategies of Rupture.)60
The analysis of constitutionality is highly innovative. Constitutional
processes, says Teubner, are an example of "double closure" as
suggested by von Foerster.61 "They are triggered when systems develop
a second order closure, in addition to their operative first-order closure,
by applying their operations reflexively to their operations." But this
double closure depends crucially on a metalevel coupling with law.
While the "constitutional," second-order closure finds expression in the
system's reflexive structuring of its operations (for example, in politics,
where power processes are directed via power processes-electoral
procedures, competences, and fundamental rights), that reflexivity itself
is the emergent property of a coupling with the reflexivity of law.
Internally, that reflexivity is expressed as a coupling of first and
second-order operations; externally, it is expressed as a coupling of the
reflexive structures of the relevant system with the law. "Constitutions
emerge when phenomena of double reflexivity arise-the reflexivity of
the self-constituting social system and reflexivity of the law that
supports self-foundation." 62 Constitutions emerge when a structural
coupling of the reflexive mechanisms of law (i.e., secondary rules) with
the reflexive mechanisms of the relevant social sector occurs. Against
Luhmann at this point, Teubner reserves the term constitutional only
for the coupling of reflexive processes within both systems. Only this
achieves the requisite density and permanence and ensures that we
have constitutional coevolution of the two social systems.
The threshold of constitutionalization is only reached once the
"hybrid binary meta-code" guides internal processes in both systems.6 3
This is achieved through the second-order coupling, with the help of
"hybrid meta-codes," that is "codes" (the code-values:
constitutional/unconstitutional) whose function is to allow the coupling
of systems at the reflexive level (hence "meta"), and "hybrid" because in
straddling the two systems there is no direct transferal of meaning
between the two orders of reflection, but in each system the coding
releases opportunities for system-specific thematization of what is
constitutional or not in relation to the pursuit of the public interest. In
the idea of the public interest and public responsibility as underlying
60. Emilios Christodoulidis, Strategies of Rupture, 20 L. & CRITIQUE 3 (2009).
61. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 103.
62. Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 110-11.
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the "additional reflection" imported at the constitutional level, we find
the normative pulse of the theory.
This is how Teubner puts it in Constitutional Fragments:
The constitutional code of the social sphere concerned
(constitutional/unconstitutional) is given precedence
over the legal code (legal/illegal). What is special about
this meta-coding, though, is its hybridity, as it takes
precedence not only over the legal code but also over the
binary code of the function system concerned. Thus it
exposes the binary-coded operations of the function
system to an additional reflexion regarding whether or
not they take account of the subsystem's public
responsibility. 64
The importance here of constitutionality is that, as a hybrid
metastructure, it enables a coupling at the metalevel and with it the
productive maintenance of dissensus. It enables a heightened level of
additional reflection. Not least amongst the functions of dissensus is the
role that it plays with regard to the "auto-limitative" moment in
protecting the blind reproduction of systems from reaching crucial
thresholds between productive and catastrophic expansion. But this is
only one of the effects of reorienting and controlling the
self-reproduction of systems in the direction of serving the common
good. And it is here that a claim for the politics of societal
constitutionalism is articulated and defended "outside institutionalised
politics" but, Teubner insists, no less robust for that. How to understand
this form of politics? For Teubner, the "political" means two things: first,
the political refers to the institutionalized politics of states; second, the
political refers to politics in society outside institutionalized politics, in
other words, to the "internal" politicization of the economy itself and
that of other social spheres (i.e., the politics of reflection on their social
identity). Here, social systems are dealing with their own founding and
decision-making paradoxes-a process that can never be determined
"technocratically." In this respect, the independent constitutions of
society beyond the state are highly political. Reclaiming la politique for
the forms of societal, extra-state reflection, he explains that "[s]ocietal
constitutionalism effectively calls for sites of political reflection to be
firmly established in the spontaneous sphere and in the organized
sphere of the economy."65 "Politicizing consumer preferences, ecologizing
64. Id. at 110.
65. Id. at 119.
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corporations, and placing monetary policy in the public domain-these
three constitutional arenas illustrate to what degree the 'internal'
politicization of social subsystems depends on the specificities of their
communicative medium."6 6 For this very reason, the difference to their
"external" politicization by state institutions must not be leveled.
Societal constitutionalism opposes the centralization of fundamental
sociopolitical issues in the political system. Its concern is to multiply the
sites where controversies are fought and decisions made about "the
political" in society.
And Teubner quotes Fischer-Lescano and Renner approvingly when
they say:
This makes the administrative apparatus of public and
private regimes more responsive to the social substrate,
i.e. to world society itself (and not to its political system,
the international community of states). It integrates it
into the process of creating modes of action, and
connects decision-making (in the legislative, executive
and judicative apparatuses) and debate (among different
global publics) with one another so that the duality
between spontaneous and organized spheres in the
formation of a social constitution-so significant in
terms of the theory of democracy-can be established. 67
I find exaggerated both the optimism of this extract and the
responsiveness it suggests. Constitutionality as metalevel reflexivity
neither underwrites nor guarantees the passage from external to
internal politicization (in other words, the "responsiveness" proclaimed
in the extract). It merely holds up the incommensurable logics of
spheres to scrutiny and indirectly only, I would argue, restores, to
return to Koselleck, "the ability of a political community" to engage in
"political action." In the final section, and in the mode of internal
critique, I will attempt to link constitutional reflexivity back to its
political dimension.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL REFLEXIVITY AS POLITICAL
Let us take a different, political route into societal constitutionalism
to test a certain hypothesis. On this other route, I will assume,
66. Id. at 121.
67. Id. at 123 (quoting ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO & MORITz RENNER, EUROPAISCHES
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 370 (2011)).
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relatively uncontroversially I hope, democracy as the organizing
principle of the political and equality as its horizon. I would suggest
that any concept of the political that does not incorporate democracy
and equality as constitutive of its meaning and as irreducible falls short
as a definition, not merely normatively. At the same time I want to
insist, as I did in the opening section, that the connection between the
political and the state is contingent, a historical achievement and
nothing more. If the operational requirements of the political system
have short-circuited democracy to the state, only in terms of which the
demos could be seen to act under systems of representation that were
largely held as adequate (though against which other configurations of
constituency, typically class, leveled their challenge), democracy was of
course never exhausted in its state form. Industrial democracy, radical
forms of syndicalism, or class struggle, to take some examples, were
animated by and geared to the aspiration of democracy and equality but
never came under the sign of state politics. Crosscutting and
undercutting identifications mark the history of democratic struggle as
a struggle over and against political ascriptions and given semantics. I
do not intend, of course, to present a full defense of the political, but I
want to set a background against which to take issue with the problem
that "the political" in its various reentries as thematized, that is, in
subsystems and aligned to subsystemic rationality, abandons in the
process something fundamental about its organizing principle
(democracy) and horizon (equality). If that is the case, the passage from
"external" to "internal" politicization is problematic, and constitutional
reflexivity will be called upon not as a facilitating, but crucially as a
blocking device. My focus and interest within the broader theory of
societal constitutionalism is in the relationship between politics and
economics. My suggestion is to recruit constitutional reflexivity in a
political role of guiding the selective withdrawal of certain areas of
social action from the logic of price.
There is a structural reason why such a political role for
constitutional reflexivity cannot be entrusted to "internal" politicization.
It has to do with what is constitutive of economic reason. If the political
is constitutively oriented to democracy and equality, any actual
instantiation and program measured against their promise, the
economic, under conditions of functional differentiation and subsystemic
autonomy, has effectively removed the processes of the organization of
production from its field of reference. The economically rational is
measured in terms of how scarce means are allocated to competing ends
against the background or in the context of "substitutable choices."
"Economics," as Foucault puts it in an important lecture, "is no longer
the analysis of the historical logic of processes; it is the analysis of the
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internal rationality, the strategic programming of individuals' activity"68
of allocating, as we said, scarce means to alternative ends. This
reorientation of economic reason away from a logic of needs and toward
"the stud[y of] human behavior as a relationship between ends and
scarce means which have mutually exclusive uses"69 has the effect of
cutting it off from the problematic of utility as measured against social
need and the problematic of participation in collective labor, let alone
the aspirations of social justice and equality. Andr6 Gorz, among many
here, has traced with extraordinary acuity how older probldmatiques of
justice have been effectively displaced by an economic reason centered
on efficiency, with specific reference to the changing landscape of
work.70 Of course, such a radical reorientation of a field around new sets
of "guiding distinctions" will generate paradoxes and tautologies. We
know this well from Luhmann. "What is an income?" asks Yale
economist Irving Fisher.71 An income is quite simply the product or
return on a capital. Conversely, he says, we will call "capital" everything
that in one way or another can be a source of future income. This
closure of economic reason around its own self-descriptions, these
tautologies, will call for a reflexivity to take care of the blockages. But in
the process, it effects a displacement on the organizing principles of the
political economy. The very injunction that capitalism dispossesses the
worker in substituting the value of the lived intelligibility and meaning
of work with an exchange value for labor becomes unintelligible.
Economic reason makes redundant the notion of the political sphere
itself as far as production is concerned. We do not need to delve into this
subject much longer to see the following point: any passage between
"external" and "internal" politicization is no passage at all. Of course, no
systems theorist would ever contemplate that common meanings might
be transferred across systemic boundaries. But for us, concerned with
reflexivity and the logic of couplings, what might we still insist is
communicated at the level of hybrid metacouplings? To be more precise,
at the metacoupling of politics and economics, what survives entry into
economic reason as the distinction between "le politique-la politique"
i.e., as economically "politicizable" in the direction of the common
interest? How would the economy visit the question of value other than
from the point of view of exchange-value? Going back to the 1844
Manuscripts, what does it mean to protect the dignity of the worker
68. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 223.
69. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONoMIC APPROACH To HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3 n.3 (1976)
(quoting L. ROBBINS, THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF EcONOMIC SCIENCE 16 (1962)).
70. See GORZ, supra note 23.
71. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 224 (quoting Irving Fisher).
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when, as Marx insisted, the worker, and not just work, was the "product
of capital?"
The problem is that with the "reentry" into the other system's
rationality, the political ceases to impact, underdetermined to the point
at which it is in all cases productive to the receiving system and
realigned to its functional imperatives. If we expect a limitative role
from the constitutional, then "public responsibility," a moment of the
political-must furnish an "additional reflection" or independent
criterion; it cannot fold seamlessly back into the logic of the
reproduction of the system. This is Teubner's point. But what, one may
ask, in the rationality of allocation of scarce means to alternative ends
might impact as protection of the common good? What in the practice of
activist shopping will stand it apart, a barrier to hitting the bottom, the
expression of a superior notion of the common good that is not always
already cashed out in terms of consumerism and hollowed out, to borrow
from Lilian Moncrieff's critique of politicized consumerism, from the
political demand "one consumer, one vote" to its economic counterpart
"one consumer, one purchase?" 72 The political actor is emphatically not
the conscientious consumer; if activist shopping is the "economic
expression" of the "political," then there is something fundamentally
wrong with these "reentries." For one, flip "activist shopping" onto the
negative: opposition to consumerism is evidently not the same, it is not
equivalent, and it is not even symmetrical to political apathy. The key
question and test for the reflexivity of societal constitutionalism is
whether it can put the market to question as an appropriate register for
a series of issues that any decent society with a fundamental
commitment to the dignity of its members would not choose to
commodify. Would a reflexive coupling allow some kind of return to
thinking of the political economy that incorporates democracy in
production as irreducible value (irreducible, that is, to functional
equivalents)? Cutting through the logic of functional equivalence via
political decisions is absolutely vital here, and the imperative is
rendered vacuous if democracy is "always-already" aligned to market
recalibration through the logic of function and equivalence. Perhaps
there is some room here for complexity and nuance. My intention was to
explore with Teubner, in terms of the resources that "societal
constitutionalism" offers, whether such a move to rein in
commodification and the ideology of the "total market," in the name of
the common good, might be possible. This requires us to return one
more time to constitutional reflexivity, and scrutinize how it functions
72. Lilian N. Moncrieff, Bound to Shop: Corporate Social Responsibility and the
Market (Jan. 19, 2011) (Ph.D thesis, University of Glasgow) (forthcoming Jan. 2014).
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at the metalevel. My conclusions may differ from Teubner's, but the
departure is the same, if more narrow: to look at how law and the
economy pivot on the political to each sustain their own reflexivity.
Without that pivot and that reliance, no metalevel reflection can be
sustained and no possibility to think the "limitative" exists. This is quite
clear I think when it comes to law and how constitutional lawyers talk
about it. If constitutional reflexivity is metalevel thinking, it is only the
orientation of the constitution in a political direction that makes it
possible. Teubner too talks about such reflexive coupling, and his
writing includes thinking that constitutionally, law "domesticates" that
rationality, though that is not the issue here. The issue is that the
metalevel thinking becomes possible because of the political dimension;
a law cannot simply renew itself in a blind positivity of its
self-reproduction, but must measure it against, and seek orientation
from, the political moment to reproduce itself as a stable order of
normative expectations in its temporal, social, and material dimensions.
That is the achievement of constitutional reflexivity: the rationalization
of law as informed by the organizing constitutional distinction, the
guiding difference constituent or constituted, whose two poles stand
opposed and asymmetrical, an asymmetry that is creatively unfolded on
both sides. I do not want to digress too much, but let me note here that
law too can be coupled at the reflexive level with either politics (as
above) or the market. In each case, first-order operations are tested
against the truth values of the second level (veridiction) that is produced
via reflexive couplings. Foucault tells the story of the rise of the market
system (at roughly the same time as Polanyi, between 1750 and 1830)
very much as the story of such a coupling of law with the market as site
of veridiction. 73
For public law, whose means of calibration and self-limitation had
relied so far on what could be identified as an expansionist
eigen-dynamic, the emergence of the market system plays the role of
catalyst. The law is confronted with the "truth" of natural equilibria.
Against this truth it can measure the legitimacy of its intervention. The
rationale of self-limitation acquires an external measure with the help
of which a role proper for public law is fashioned. A coupling now
ensures the proper self-limitation of power and crucially, (jurisdiction
"one must not govern too much" is granted a means to rationalize
"excess"), it ensures the orientation of public law in terms of a guiding
distinction of public or private that delimits proper spheres of
application and a rationale for intervention and connects the perennial
73. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 27-50.
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quest for legitimacy to the veridiction of the market.74 With veridiction,
the stakes are raised and, significantly, the reflexive question is
imported through a different metalevel coupling. The market as the
correlative or accompanying self-reference now sets the criteria of
"correct" choices. Could it be then that the economy too can only pull
itself on to the reflexive plane with the help of the political, and thus
also attempt the reining in of its blind self-reproduction on the register
of the political economy? Only here can the limitative be fashioned as
something capable of providing the independent criterion as that which
suspends, in certain spheres, the self-reproduction of an economy that
insatiably commodifies and feeds off its own aggressive expansion. In
this suspension, reflexivity becomes the blocking device; it withdraws
certain issues, such as the protection of collective agreements, from
economic determination.
Here is the problem for the metalevel of the economy as I see it. The
economic system hoists itself reflexively onto the metalevel via the
distinction "in the public interest or not in the public interest" such that,
contentless, is too underdetermined to sustain it on that plane. Either it
seeks the criteria of what might fashion it as an independent, reflexive
inquiry, through political criteria, or it seeks them in the logic of price
(CSR, activist shopping), which cannot sustain it at the metalevel, and
collapses it back to the functional level. Of course, nothing guarantees
the range and resilience of those political determinations that uphold
the "constitutional" of economic constitutionalism. Often they are simply
incongruous, stubborn attempts to hold the line. Take the example of
the constitutionalization of social dumping that is the European Court
of Justice's (ECJ's) recent decisions (Laval and Viking, for example)75 on
74. That it discovers a certain naturalness specific to the practice of governance itself is
key here. Never before-Polanyi has put it so brilliantly in talking about the homo
economicus in Adam Smith's account of economic rationality in man-had such a
misreading of what comes naturally to man been so prophetic. The role of the
"natural"-in this crucial sense of human nature-subtends the operation of public law,
providing it with a rationale for actions, limits, crucially its measure. And yet it is never
anything except the projection from within the logic of governmentality of its object: the
substratum of the govern-able. "It is," he says, "if you like, its indispensable hypodermis."
Id. at 16. It is to this self-referentiality of law that the market gives leverage. In fact
without it, Foucault tells us (if not in these precise terms), the self-referentiality could not
pick itself up off the ground. "[The] action [of the governors] has an underside, or rather, it
has another face, and this other face of governmentality, its specific necessity, is precisely
what political economy studies. It is not background, but a permanent correlative." (Id. at
16 (emphasis added). It is this accompanying self-reference, this naturalness in respect of
which the action of government unfolds.
75. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetaref6rbundet,
2007 E.C.R. 1-11767; Case C-438/05, Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP,
2007 E.C.R. 1-10779.
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issues of social protection and industrial action. Christian Joerges's
"solution" is a direct affront to market integration: respect Finnish law,
he suggests, and respect the efforts of trade unions to coordinate labor
interests transnationally. "I fear," he says, "that there is no third way
here except the stubborn insistence to protect the achievements of
Finnish law in this case."'76 Another example is Wolfgang Streeck's call
for a "democratic departure from the life-threatening sedation provided
by cheap-money capitalism" involving the "revitali[zation of the] trade
union movement" across frontiers in Europe.77 In each case, the
reflexivity of the economic constitution is harnessed to political criteria
and informed by political reflexivity. What is significant about the
difference? It is that reflexivity here is not an invitation to the economy
to think in the public interest; it is an injunction against the
commensurability of claims. It is a political injunction against the
"pooling" of freedoms of workers and entrepreneurs to strike and to
reflag respectively and against the flattening device of "proportionality"
that allows "the balancing" of labor rights against economic rights. It is
therefore an injunction against the submission of the dignity of labor to
the economic reasoning of comparative advantage. Any assumed
passage from external to internal politicization cancels out the
injunction and collapses the reflexivity in the guise of merely
transferring them onto the plane of economic reason.
CONCLUSION
In a circuitous way, and one which I had not set off to follow, we
have arrived back to societal constitutionalism at the metalevel with a
clearer view of the stakes and of the dilemma facing us. I have warned
against the logic of functional equivalence and have argued that a
critical systems theory must embrace a political reflexivity if it is to
claim back democratic self-understandings and epistemological
premises that have come increasingly to measure themselves against
the market as a site of veridiction. And perhaps also we are now in a
position to raise otherwise the reflexive question over what is societal
about societal constitutionalism. The double slippage that we began
with now becomes clearer as the dilemma that confronts us between
politics or the market as that which sustains constitutional reflection.
Against the danger of market capture, where the market calls forth the
"societal" by submitting it to functional imperatives, and, in the final
76. Christian Joerges, Will the Welfare State Survive European Integration? 1 EUR. J.
Soc. L. 4, 17 (2011).
77. Wolfgang Streeck, Markets and Peoples: Democratic Capitalism and European
Integration, 73 NEW LEFT REV. 63, 70 (2012) (emphasis added).
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instance, harnessing it to market allocations, we are invited to rethink
it along the political dimension as political economy. Let us strive to
take that opportunity while it still remains meaningful, before the
collapse of democratic categories into market thinking seals over the
space where a politics is still possible without the logic of price.

